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Executive Summary
Russia is currently in an economic crisis the likes of which the Russian people are
unfortunately familiar with in their turbulent past. Economic sanctions, paired with
a global downturn in oil prices, have stalled any progress that had been occurring
after the 2008 global economic meltdown. The Central Bank of Russia, which was
founded after the fall of the USSR in the early 1990s, was quick to respond to the
sanctions and domestic economic issues by laying out an Anti-Crisis plan along
with the aid of the rest of the government. They raised interest rates to over 20%,
passed legislation to bolster citizens’ trust in their rubles, and allowed banks to
draw more capital from the Reserve Fund, among other things. There was no
coherent strategy, but the overall goal to strengthen the economy from its lowest
points has appeared to have worked, although there is still much more to work on
for Russia’s future.
Beyond the government’s monetary policy and responses to the crisis, the financial
markets of Russia also play an important role in the recovery of the nation. The
Moscow Exchange is the financial center for stock trading in Russia. The two most
well-known indexes are the MICEX (ruble-denominated) and the RTS (U.S. dollardenominated). Through 2016, the Russian MICEX stock market has proven to be
quite robust, proving yet again that Russia can seemingly always adapt to their
situation. In fact, the MICEX index has increased 22.72% this year so far, as of
September 22, 2016, with some stocks such as Aeroflot trading at a staggering
217.75% increase over its price at the beginning of this year. However, it is not
quite as rosy as it seems, with some underlying problems which may erase the
gains of this year at any time.
The situation in Russia is something that Americans should be paying attention to.
There is a fine line between damaging our relationship so much that we enter a
new “Cold War” era, and being able to reconcile differences and resume more
friendly relations. Americans need to do what they can to prove that as a nation,
America would much rather be an ally and work with Russia than be their enemy,
because this is a better outcome for all involved. Russian leaders need to also
realize that they must compromise with the West if they wish to be a true economic
superpower.
Lastly, it has been proven over and over in history that Russians are tough people.
Normal Russian citizens may seem to be in a very bad situation with the decrease
of the ruble’s value and more expensive goods and services; however, there are
three examples compiled with help from a Russian professor at Western Michigan
University, Liliya Vansovich, showing that Russians are actually quite optimistic
about the future and do not notice a huge change in their daily lives. Given their
turbulent past, this should really come as no surprise but it is a powerful insight
nonetheless. In the end, the Russian people will overcome the current challenges
and their best is yet to come.
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1. Introduction
Russia: for most the name conjures up vivid imagery of the Soviet Union, vodka, incredible
nature, and a rich cultural history. Russia is by far the largest country in the world, and is
also one of the most misunderstood by those who live within the Western worldview. The
aim of this paper is to shed light on how the financial system is working in Russia; from
the Central Bank of Russia’s history and its current policies (along with some other
government policies), to an explanation of why the economy is in so much trouble, to an
insight into the biggest financial markets that exist in Russia. Then, the ramifications for
the U.S. will be explored regarding the financial situation in Russia. The other goal of this
paper is to show how the Russian culture is reflected in their financial situation, and lastly
to provide an insight into how normal Russians have dealt with the sharp economic
downturn.

2. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR)
2.1 BRIEF HISTORY

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is the direct equivalent of the U.S.’s Federal Reserve,
in that it sets monetary policy for the nation, as well as having the responsibility of issuing
currency (just the issuing, not the actual printing). From the bank’s official website, it states
that its main goal is to “protect the ruble and ensure its stability.” The bank also aims to
“promote the development of and strengthen the Russian banking system, ensure the
stability and development of the national payment system, and develop the financial market
of the Russian Federation and ensure its stability.” It is intended to operate independently
from federal, regional, and local government structures under the Constitution of the
Russian Federation to avoid the pressures of politics in its decision making. The bank’s
leaders are appointed rather than elected, also similar to the U.S. Federal Reserve.
The Central Bank of Russia was founded on July 13, 1990. The foundation for a central
bank was already in place thanks to the existing structures of the State Bank of the USSR,
so the CBR morphed out of this. The website says that the CBR was “declared…to be the
only body of state monetary and foreign exchange regulation” and was also given the
functions of issuing currency and setting the ruble exchange rate, which it did not have
when it was still known as the State Bank of the USSR. From 1991-1992, the CBR
commercialized existing specialized banks’ branches in order to create the network of
commercial banks needed for the transition to a capitalistic-style system. In this time the
CBR also “began to buy and sell foreign exchange in the currency market that it
established, as well as setting and publishing official exchange rates of foreign currencies
against the ruble.”
Moving along to 1998, the bank leaders saw the developing economy in a crisis (technically
the 2nd major crisis, after the hyperinflation of the early 1990s), in which several strategies
were employed by the bank. They worked on restructuring the banking system to improve
the performance of commercial banks while also increasing their liquidity, in order to make
it easier for the commercial banks to respond to problems quickly. By the middle of 2001
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these efforts were largely successful in helping Russia’s banking sector overcome this
crisis, according to the CBR.
After the recovery, the CBR shifted its monetary policy focus to maintaining financial
stability. The goal in any nation is to create an environment that can foster sustainable
economic growth. Many policies were put into place by the CBR, but to summarize, the
main points of the plan included the cutting of interest rates, the lowering of inflation
expectations, and lastly, the lowering of the actual inflation rate. The inflation had been an
issue throughout the 1990s simply because of the fact that Russia was in the process of a
large shift in philosophy and government (Also as an emerging market, such countries
generally have high inflation, especially in their infancy). The measures taken by the CBR
allowed the ruble to gain against other currencies and financial market stability was
increased. No drastic or market-crushing fluctuations occurred in the exchange rate
following these policies. This graph from tradingeconomics.com illustrates the relative
stability of the ruble between 2000 and 2008, where it traded mostly between 25-30 rubles
per dollar.

In 2003, the CBR was able to introduce international financial reporting standards (IFRS).
The CBR claims this “improved banking supervision and prudential reporting” and was
undoubtedly put into place to help Russia’s image on the international level; this is key for
attracting international investments. The period from 2001-2003 was considered successful
in establishing sound policies and a better reputation which helped the Russian economy
grow steadily. Below is a graph from the World Bank (via tradingeconomics.com) showing
the effects of the policies put into place at this time: the Russian GDP grew at a steady pace
up until the world financial crisis in 2008. The GDP growth rate was also fairly stable from
2000-2008, with an average growth rate between these years of 6.96%, much stronger than
the U.S.’s average in the same period of 2.33%.
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But the CBR did not sit idle after putting in these policies in place. From the CBR’s official
website, they state, “In April 2005, the Russian Government and the Bank of Russia
adopted the Banking Sector Development Strategy for the period up to 2008.” This
document had the goal of “[the] enhancement of the banking sector’s stability and
efficiency.” These banking sector reforms of 2005-2008 had hoped to accomplish, but did
not fully meet, the Russian government’s objective to end the overwhelming reliance on
raw materials of the Russian economy. In the most current stage of reforms (20092015), the Russian Government and CBR wanted to focus on improving the Russian
banking sector’s positioning in, and attractiveness to, international financial markets.
However, the leaders of the country still had to deal with the challenges of the previous
period, along with the sanctions put into place after the Crimean annexation on February
23, 2014. Because of the policies of Russia’s leaders in the government and because
oligarchs still have incredible power in affecting the economy, it has been incredibly hard
for Russia to move beyond the relatively easy money of natural resources. With such a
well-qualified and educated workforce, this is really a shame because Russia has massive
potential if it could be fully utilized the way that the CBR had hoped it could be.
2.2 CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION AND POLICIES (2014-2016)

To fully understand what the CBR is contending with in regards to its current policies, it is
necessary to understand what happened initially in 2014 after the Crimean annexation. The
CBR, as talked about in the previous section, had a plan put in place for 2009-2015 which,
in part, would work towards the end of the raw materials bias on the Russian economy,
Russia’s persistent problem for years. The Central Bank hoped to accomplish the task by
diversifying the economy and exploiting Russia’s competitive advantages, the basic rules
to maximize the effectiveness of international trade. This may be a great strategic plan on
paper, but the Crimean annexation in early 2014 and the massive market downturn which
followed after oil prices dropped threw a wrench in the works for the leaders of the bank.
By the time the downturn arrived, the government did not yet accomplish the task of
diversification, and even in 2015 a staggering 70% of export revenues and 20% of the GDP
was still directly linked to energy and raw material resources. The financial sanctions in
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particular have restricted foreign capital for Russian banks and businesses, which they have
come to heavily depend on. For a supporting example, 80% of total investments in Russia
in 2013 could be traced to Europe. To get foreign capital, the only real direction that Russia
can currently look is East: to markets in Asia, with higher costs for foreign investors and
much more difficult access when compared to Europe. The current government does not
seem to be willing to make all the changes that would free up businesses to fully thrive in
Russia’s quasi-capitalistic system. There is still a feeling of an over-reaching bureaucracy
stemming growth. Thus, the CBR is faced with challenges seemingly insurmountable in
the current political environment.
One of the first tasks early in the crisis was to raise interest rates considerably, up to over
20%. The reasoning for a steep increase was to stem inflation, stem the money supply
through more expensive lending, and for citizens to trust their ruble deposits in the banks.
High interest rates favor those who save money in banks. Initially there was a scramble
from Russians to buy up foreign currencies to hedge against the falling ruble, and the mass
selling of rubles did nothing to help its drastic fall from the sanctions and oil price decline.
If Russians could trust their bank deposits and see them grow with high interest rates, they
would be at least a little less likely to attempt switching their holdings to foreign currencies.
As prices in Russia have increased due to the less valuable ruble, one can only imagine
how bad it could have been had the CBR not taken action immediately; if rubles are earning
a large enough percentage to keep up with the price increases, the damage would be
minimized.
The Russian government also announced an “Anti-Crisis” plan to combat the worst of the
economic problems. A report titled The Economic and Financial Crisis in Russia compiled
by the OSW (A Polish acronym for the Center for Eastern Studies based in Warsaw)
describes the seven-point plan being laid out “which provided for increasing the volume of
currency credit available to banks in order to improve their foreign currency liquidity,
easing the restrictions on banks with regard to the setting of interest rates on loans and
deposits, and easing the requirements concerning mandatory reserves” (OSW, 2015, p. 8).
Some of these post-crisis actions were not taken by the CBR, but they were an important
part in the response and therefore should be mentioned. The state Duma, which is the lower
house of Russia’s legislature (similar to America’s House of Representatives), set forth
legislative amendments which provided “1 billion rubles in extra capital [for] banks [as
well as the] doubling of the volume of guarantees for deposits of Russian citizens” (OSW,
2015, p. 8), once again no doubt to entice Russians to keep their rubles. The Reserve Fund
could now be drawn up to 70% of its value, and the government has been using this fund
liberally to pay for all its programs. Vladimir Putin infamously called oligarchs who owned
large businesses and “persuaded” them to sell some of the foreign currency that they were
earning. Counter-sanctions on certain agricultural and food products were imposed as
retaliation on those certain countries who placed sanctions on Russia (although this
measure drove up food prices considerably). There were more counter-measures taken by
the government, but this snapshot shows the many multi-layered decisions involved in
coping with the crisis. It is important to note that these actions did not add up to a coherent
strategy to fix Russia’s markets, because the problems with Russia’s financial markets go
much deeper than just the current instability with the West. These methods were, if nothing
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more, a haphazard collection of policies aimed at stemming the bleeding. The Russian
minister for economic development, Alexei Ulyukayev, went so far as to admit the
measures were “largely reactive” to the crisis.
As far as how the situation looks in 2016 from Russia’s (i.e. their government’s) point of
view, there was a perception of slight improvement in the economy in early 2016 due to
several developments. There was at least a glimpse of a more stable situation in Ukraine,
at least until August of 2016 when tensions increased once more, with troop and materiel
movements in Crimea/Eastern Ukraine and the fragile agreements from the Minsk ceasefire
now in jeopardy of shattering. Some of the braver foreign investors are, for the most part,
believing once again that Russia is worth investing in. One great example of this is German
investments in 2015; German investments quadrupled in 2015 compared with 2014 (from
$350 million to $1.42 billion, according to the CBR). Assets in Russia are much cheaper
than they were several years ago because of the ruble depreciation, which is why if an
investor can stomach the risk, Russia is very attractive even with the economic and
financial crises. Also, interest rates are much lower from their above-20% highs during the
worst of the crisis. The key rate, as of July 29, 2016, is at 10.5%. The lowering of the rate
over the last year and a half is a good sign to citizens and investors that the situation is
improving. The economy only shrank by 0.6% in the second quarter of 2016, compared
with the 1.2% shrinkage in the first quarter. Inflation is also down to around 7% compared
to the 16% of 2015. External macroeconomic forces which may influence Russian
progress, such as inflation and food prices in developed countries that Russia trades with,
are also minimal, due to low global inflation and lowering food prices in these nations.
Many of Russia’s developed trading partners are also continuing an easy money policy,
such as the European Central Bank with their recent quantitative easing policies (these
policies increase the money supply, which makes money more available but also hurts the
value of the currency). The ruble depreciation was less significant when compared to the
oil price volatility of recent months. But do not let this slight improvement fool you; there
are still three major issues hampering further recovery:
1. High economic uncertainty in the country
2. Continuing weak consumer demand
3. Difficult lending conditions
So what is the Bank of Russia planning on doing in 2016 to further their goals? First off,
the CBR takes into account oil prices and oil price forecasts in any decisions they make,
due to the very connected nature of oil and the Russian economy. They will watch oil
closely when determining if there should be any rate change decisions. For the time being,
they have kept the key interest rate at 10.5%. Compared with the end of 2015, where key
rates were at 11%, this is an improvement. The Bank will continue to lower the rate as
targets are met; namely, oil prices stabilizing (or increasing), China’s economy rebounding
from its slowdown, and high inflation expectations relaxing. The CBR believes that the
price of oil will stabilize at around $50 per barrel because oil is getting more expensive to
get out of the ground, and also because of increasing exports coming out of Iran due to the
lifted sanctions. In September 2016, prices are right about $50, so the bank predicted this
well in their December 2015 report on monetary policy. The CBR is also continuing a tight
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monetary policy until inflation moves closer to their medium-term goal of 4%. As of
August 2016, the inflation has dropped to 6.9%, a very promising sign for the bank. As
inflation lowers and borrowers’ (in the real sector of the economy) financial positions
improve, the bank will ease its policy in line with lowering the key rate. Lending will grow
and the money supply will grow with it. With household incomes and spending thought to
be stagnant for the time being, the CBR fully expects some contraction in the GDP in 2016,
but believes that in 2017 it will grow at a low, positive number (likely less than 1.5%), and
that in 2018 GDP will be able to grow at between 1.5-2.5%.
With continuing increasing production of exportable intermediate goods and more
incentives for producers and consumers to use import substitution, the adaptability of the
Russian economy is lowering the risk of the CBR’s worst-case scenario, a good sign for
Russian citizens. However, if there is an increase in the volatility of financial markets along
with continuing restricted consumer demand (among other factors), inflation may be higher
than what the CBR is predicting, and the bank will have to react accordingly. If the CBR
feels that inflation will not be lower than 7% by December 2016, they will take several
specific actions. First, they will keep the key rate higher than they would with their baseline
or optimistic scenarios. Then, according to their Monetary Policy Report, they will
“significantly increase the amount of FX (Foreign Exchange Market) refinancing
operations and, if necessary…carry out direct sales of foreign currency in the domestic FX
market (The Central Bank of Russia, 2015, p. 49).

3. Russia’s Financial Markets
3.1 BRIEF HISTORY

On January 9, 1992, the CBR and the largest of the commercial banks that had recently
been created jointly established the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX). In
July 1995, the Russian Trading System (RTS) established their own exchange, with their
calculated index beginning on September 1, 1995, which is denominated in USD. Then on
September 22, 1997, the MICEX started calculating an index as well, which is similar to
the RTS index except that it is denominated in rubles. In 2009, the MICEX became the
first Russian exchange to reach full member status of the World Federation of Exchanges,
a great boost to its legitimacy and international status. 2011 saw the RTS and MICEX
exchanges merge into the MICEX-RTS. Now both of these indices and exchanges are part
of the Moscow Exchange umbrella (MICEX-RTS was re-branded as MOEX, or simply
Moscow Exchange, in 2012), which is today the largest exchange in Russia – similar in
that respect to America’s New York Stock Exchange. The RTS and MICEX indices are
both “capitalization-weighted composite indices calculated based on [the] prices of the 50
most liquid Russian stocks of the largest…Russian issuers with economic activities related
to the main sectors of the Russian economy presented on the Exchange” (Moscow
Exchange, 2016).
3.2 CURRENT MARKET CONDITIONS AND OUTLOOK

In 2016, the Russian stock market is considered by most to be a good place for investors
from all over the world. From January 2016 up to now, the index has steadily climbed up,
and as of September 30, 2016, was at 1,978.00. The MICEX was actually the 5th best
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performing stock market in the world in 2015. What has been shown by sanctions is that
they actually make stocks, at least those on MICEX that are ruble-denominated, a bargain
which can be easily capitalized on. But, according to Matthew Lynn of MarketWatch, the
recovery has only been modest and may not sustain growth for a long period of time,
meaning that the stock markets going up cannot be something that is expected to keep
happening. So for those who are able to brave some risk (a recurring theme with Russia),
the markets are a great place to invest currently but if any sign of a slippage occurs, the
markets could come crashing down again very quickly. Until technological industries can
find a solid, profitable place in the Russian economy to diversify the risk involved with
natural resources, Lynn believes that the stock markets will continue to ebb and flow as
commodity prices increase or decrease.
As mentioned earlier, the huge rally of the MICEX is largely due to the fact that rubles are
so undervalued compared to the dollar. The RTS USD-denominated index has been
performing rather poorly in comparison (at 990.88 as of September 30, 2016), when its
levels in 2012 were of the magnitude of 1,600. This index really shows that the recovery
has not been as strong as Russia needs it to be. Despite this, it does not diminish the fact
that conditions in 2016 are more favorable than in 2014 and 2015. The MICEX market is
strong at the moment and the RTS is doing well in the current year, but the markets alone
cannot prop up the Russian people. Continuing progress hinges on what the government
does next. This situation is reminiscent to the U.S. stock market in 2016. It is still doing
well, can be great to invest in, and is hitting record highs regularly, but this is largely due
to the low interest rates. When the Federal Reserve decides to finally raise rates, most
experts agree that the markets will drop sharply. It is much the same in Russia, in the sense
that the high performance is more of a bubble, propped up artificially almost, and could
falter at any time.
Below are three graphs. The first is the MICEX index over the last 5 years. The second is
the RTS index over the same time period. Between these graphs, you can see that the RTS
index, being USD-denominated, has not been nearly as strong as the MICEX over the
longer-term. The third figure is a comparison between the MICEX, RTS, and the SPY ETF
fund’s (which mimics the performance of the S&P 500) returns over the last year up to
September 30, 2016. Here is where you can really see how the Russian markets are
rebounding strong in the current year. Whereas the SPY is normal at around a 13.31%
return, the MICEX has returned 22.56% and the RTS has returned an impressive 29.54%.
All of these graphs have been sourced from Bloomberg.
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Figure 1: MICEX 5-year Performance

Figure 2: RTS 5-year Performance

Figure 3: Comparison in Returns Between RTS (orange), MICEX (blue), and SPY ETF (red)
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4. Implications for America
A bad relationship with Russia can be summed up in three words: Cold War Two. Since
the fall of communism in the early 1990s, the U.S. has been working towards having a
much more positive relationship with Russia compared to the era before. Having Russia as
an ally is good for everyone: from trading goods and services to understanding the cultures,
the U.S. and Russia can both experience prosperity. However, with Russia’s illegal
annexation and occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, America cannot just step aside
because it so strongly affects us and our ideals as a country. It would set a dangerous
precedent for the future if the collective of Europe and the U.S. turned a blind eye to Putin’s
actions. The only logical response short of boots on the ground is one of politics, summits,
and symbolism of things such as ceasefires. However, as we are moving into the autumn
of 2016, it has become clear that most of America’s policies have failed to deliver any real
change. The sanctions especially have had a negative impact on the relationships with
Russia that the U.S. and Great Britain have.
In recent months, Russia has been conducting military exercises over the Baltic Sea and
coming dangerously close to NATO forces, which are also gathering near the Russian
border in preparation for a worst-case scenario. While there may still be better ways of
dealing with the problem non-militarily, pressure from NATO and the U.S. using troops
and materiel as deterrents would be likely to produce results when compared to the dismal
performance of political policies. The main goal of all parties, of course, is to avoid an allout war, despite the threats both sides have thrown and the mind-games that are being
played. If the U.S. and NATO prove to Russia that they cannot get away with what they
are doing, it is likely that they will back down from future moves of a similar fashion.
Moving forward as a country, we always want to improve our global relationships,
especially with world powers like Russia. With continuing sanctions, we need to look at it
in the economic sense of the law of diminishing returns. At some point, the sanctions will
become simply ineffective. In fact, in a recent forum about Russia put on by the Milken
Institute, experts on Russia discussed the current situation that the country finds itself in
and brought forward some interesting points. Called “Russia: A Riddle Wrapped in a
Mystery Inside an Enigma?”, Steven Hellman, the former CEO of Credit Suisse for Russia
and the Commonwealth of Independent States, said that Russia is now seeing sanctions as
being in place indefinitely and country leaders are factoring their effects into new policies,
basically rendering them completely redundant. On top of ineffective sanctions, the West’s
current policies allow for anti-Western leaders in Russia to push their agendas against the
West and raise the level of nationalism, which is potentially dangerous. It could lead to the
new Cold War scenario mentioned earlier. Our leaders need to be 100% transparent with
their intentions and be keenly aware of what direction Russia is turning; they need know
when enough is enough and when new ideas are needed.
Also according to the Milken Institute, there are some more consequences we should be
aware of from isolating Russia, beyond giving anti-West leaders the power to change the
climate of the country as previously mentioned. Isolation will make Russia more
unpredictable, while reinforcing their military-industrial complex, still very strong from
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the USSR era. With isolationism also comes restriction on information, which along with
lower levels of tourism and international business for foreigners, allows the next generation
of Russians to develop the anti-West feelings we have tried so hard to quell since the fall
of communism. As Westerners, we should do our part to look beyond the propaganda of
both countries and learn everything possible about Russia and its incredible people. We
can do trade with them and interact with them online and by visiting Russia to show that
we are not hostile, as their government may want them to believe. In the fragile world we
live in it is imperative to realize that governments are not the people. Globalization and
trade is the key to the incredible growth in medicine, technology, and overall quality of life
that humans have experienced in the 20th and 21st centuries. Hopefully there will be a way
to resolve the issues before more permanent rifts and wars occur.

5. Russian Citizens’ Viewpoints
The Russian culture is drastically different to the culture that those in the West are used to.
Because it is part of Europe and also Asia, an interesting mix has created a truly unique
country. Even though the Asian part of Russia far exceeds the European part, the Slavic
ethnic group of people makes up around 80% of the population. However, in that remaining
20% there are an estimated 85 groups of native peoples of greatly varying characteristics
and origins. There is a Jewish autonomous oblast, Tatar- and Bashkir-dominated Muslim
republics, and groups like the Buddhist Buryats in the Republic of Buryatia in Eastern
Siberia. However different these groups may seem, there is one underlying trait that they
have in common. As Liliya Vansovich (Russian professor at WMU) summarized, “during
the communist era of the Soviet Union, a complex culture of subordination developed in
which peoples learned to submit to the higher authorities and rely on the government to
provide their basic needs.” Because of this, there also developed the “stereotypical”
characteristics of Russians; they tend to be skilled at deception (mainly in terms of the
government) in order to gain advantages for themselves and their loved ones. The capitalist
reforms of the last 20 years have greatly challenged the way Russian culture was, because
it has been such a drastic shift in society. This is evident in the way Putin treats his inner
circle of friends and how the oligarchs came to power during the initial reforms. These
generalizations may be true, but it must be kept in mind that they are mainly referring to
the older generation of Russians. Those born after the fall of communism are more likely
to be influenced by Western ideals and culture.
However bleak this makes Russians look, following are some real perspectives from people
who have either visited Russia or have lived in Russia for their entire lives, which show
that the Russian spirit is tough to break, no matter how hard economic times may seem.
Russians are very emotional people and loyal towards their loved ones. As Maria Johnson,
a Western Michigan student, observed when she visited her biological family in Russia,
“The Russian people have such big heart and the landscape has such beauty…everywhere
I met very kind, hard-working people.” She did not witness any of her Russian relatives
complaining about their lives, and they all expressed great enthusiasm about the future of
their country. If they had one complaint, it is that there is still too much bureaucracy for
capitalism to work to its full effectiveness, and bribes (which are a by-product of the
communist era culture, as already stated) are still rather common, unfortunately. As far as
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the sanctions go, Maria’s family did not feel that they had adversely affected the small
businesses in their city of Stavropol, a city which is located approximately 1400 km south
of Moscow.
Anna, an entrepreneur who lives in Moscow, summed up her thoughts in a Skype
conversation with Liliya Vansovich (translated from Russian):
“Our country is huge. I don’t know how the peoples beyond the Urals deal with
economic sanctions against Russia, which I personally consider absolute political
nonsense, but the life of the people in Moscow and in nearby regions did not seem
to change a lot. I am sure that these economic sanctions also harm those who
imposed them (I have business contacts with Germans and Italians, and they
complain a lot about that). They certainly impact us, but not as much as it was
meant to. Most of my acquaintances and friends do not think that economic
sanctions impact them personally, although they now face price increases,
inflation, lower wages and pensions. But, again, these domestic economic
problems are the result, first of all, of the failed economic programs of our
government, and are not the consequences of the imposed sanctions.
“Still, I’d like to emphasize the idea that the finances of my relatives’ families are
in fair shape and they are sure that their financial situation will improve in coming
years. You probably won’t believe it, but the sanctions somehow impact us in one
positive way: they make us work harder, look for different ways of conducting
business, seek and develop the natural and human resources within our country.
We need to stop being lazy and [only] rely only on oil and gas. Some of our leading
economists cautioned long ago that the country needs to expand production [to
things other than natural resources], not simply export fossil fuels to ensure stable
growth. Russians are strong, and this situation with sanctions makes people even
stronger. You’ve definitely heard the expression “New Russians”. They are
different from Russia’s mafia. I am a true representative of “New Russians”. We
are young people with sharp minds (because we survived the horrible period of
transition from socialism [and communism] to today’s something + ism) and a nose
for business, coupled with a taste for conspicuous consumption (thank God this
kind of addiction to things is gradually disappearing), foreign real estate (Russians
have real estate all over the world) and extravagant holidays abroad.
“I would say, these sanctions did Russians (we might not yet have realized it
completely) a big favor: people unite their efforts to overcome these temporary
obstacles, and their pride for the country and for themselves keeps growing. There
are definitely people in Russia who think differently and feel differently, but these
sanctions, no doubt, increased patriotism in general and confirmed our stable
cultural values: firm loyalty to the family and boundless generosity towards those
we know, our fierce patriotism and resilience that has served us well under Stalin’s
purges, the “Great Patriotic War” of 1941-1945, and the whirlwind of capitalism
(actually a something + ism) with its accompanying hardships that we are facing
currently.”
14

Anna was also kind enough to provide her opinion on how Americans think of Russia:
“I visited New York in 2013 as the representative of our tourist agency. It was my
first visit to the U.S. Of course I tried to see as much of America as possible. I
traveled a lot, met with many representatives of different tourist agencies regarding
the possibility of business cooperation in the future, talked to people in restaurants
and other public establishments, and was surprised how little common Americans
know about Russia and [the] Russian people. And I think it’s the biggest barrier in
establishing better understanding between our nations. Don’t listen to
“propaganda”. Get on the plane, come to our country, live and work here for a
while, immerse yourself in culture, traditions, and language, and then, probably,
you’ll start getting the sense of the value of Russia and [of] our people for the
world.”
Professor Vansovich was lastly able to speak to a deputy of the Administration of the Tula
District and the city of Tula, which is in the Tulskaya Oblast about 200 km south of
Moscow. Liliya describes him and his opinions on the Russian people as such:
“His name is Alexander and he is 29, part of a new breed of consultant apparatchik,
young and flush with enthusiasm to make Russia a better place. He admits that
the biggest problems of the common Russian people are bureaucracy of all
governmental structures, the still unclear taxation system, bribery, and nepotism.
These problems for him come first in his work. He is determined to fight them with
all possible means, and strongly believes that a new generation of “apparatchiki”
(people serving in governmental establishments) is coming, who are honest,
disciplined, and ready to serve Russian people, not to be above them.
“At the same time he emphasized that there are many attractive aspects in Russian
society today, and the one he is mostly proud of is its supportive and generous
social programs. These social programs (free education, health care, etc.) help
millions of Russians today manage to get by on what appears to be impossible
sums of money according [when compared to] wages in the West.”
The following are Alexander’s brief thoughts about how he sees himself and the sanctions:
“I consider myself a patriot, since I love my country and want it to prosper. I work
in [the] state service. My goal in life is the prosperity of Russia and its people.
Imposed economic sanctions bother me. But we have tremendous resources
within the country and people’s support to minimize the impact of them.”

6. Conclusion
As a nation, Russia is facing some serious growing pains that come along with being a
fairly new (in political terms) country. The remnants of the Soviet-era culture are still alive
today, albeit mostly in the older generation of Russians, and it still affects how Russia’s
leaders see the world. It should come as no surprise, then, that Russia annexed Crimea on
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shaky claims and with strong-arm tactics. To the Western world which did not understand
the Soviet Union and its culture, this new Russia is much the same way, marred by
stereotypes that are unhelpful for seeking out the truth.
Russia’s annexation was coupled with a sharp decline of oil prices in the same year, which
lead to a huge market downturn for them and renewed hardships. Rubles lost value
considerably, going from around 35 RUB-1 USD to highs of around 75 RUB-1 USD.
Slapping the sanctions on added insult to injury, but Western leaders could not come up
with a better plan for this misunderstood nation. But, 2 years along, Russia is beginning to
show the world what it is made of: the CBR and government worked together on policies
to combat sanctions (which did increase prices, but for the long-term can be helpful). With
“permanent sanction” scenarios in place, the CBR and government can adjust the economy
through policies which will allow for prosperity in spite of worsening relationships with
the West.
Americans in particular will need to wake up to the reality of Russia and react accordingly.
Yes, America cannot and will not stand for people losing their freedoms (like in Ukraine),
but we need to remember as a country the need to learn about these other cultures so that
our dialogues with them can be more productive. America has been Russia’s nemesis for
the majority of the 20th century and there is no need for this in the modern age. Working
together will be a challenge, because this is a give and take relationship and Russia will
need to give on certain things as well, and it will be best for all if we can do so.
Despite the bad foreign relationships, less-valuable rubles, and sanctions stopping Russians
from trading effectively with the West, Russians have always proven themselves to be
extremely resourceful and positive no matter what the situation. A look through their
history will confirm this, what with the tsars, Stalin’s purges, and the “Great Patriotic War”
(WWII). The shift to capitalism is still a long way from fully realizing its potential in
Russia, but the people’s strength will no doubt carry them through. In the end, Russia has
stood the test of time, and will continue to do so for generations to come.
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